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of rent thereafter accruing, that until the termination of the summary pro-
ceedings, the statutory tenant has, by reason of the emergency rent legis-
lation, a lawful right to occupy the premises.3 5
In the recent case of Boynzton v. Bassford the emergency rent regulations
prevented the landlord from commencing summary proceedings for several
months following the expiration date specified in the notice of termination
and the court held that since "he had no choice in the matter, no conclusion
as to an intent to waive the notice or renew the tenancy can be drawn from
the fact that he accepted rent during those months."3 7 Although in its refer-
ence to the absence of choice the court was probably thinking particularly
of the matter of time of initiating the proceedings, the decision, is, nevertheless,
sound and should be followed, but, it is submitted, on the broader ground
that in a statutory tenancy the nature of the holding and the status of the
landlord relative thereto make unwarranted the implication of such intent
from the mere fact of the acceptance of rent.
CORPORATIONS-STOCKHOLDERS' CONTROL BY AGREEMENT
Group business enterprises are conducted under various forms: the corpora-
tion, the partnership and unincorporated business associations such as the joint
stock company and the business trust. The really distinctive feature about
the corporation is that it is entirely the creature of the state.1 The other forms
of business endeavor result from the common law agreement of the members
even though the state may require certain acts on their part not actually affect-
ing their being.2 For certain purposes the federal and state governments and
the courts may even assimilate these business groups into the category of cor-
porations; 3 yet the outstanding characteristic of the corporation is that the
35. In Morrison v. Jacobs, [19451 1 K. B. 577 (C. A.), Scott, L. J., states (at 581):
"The true view is that the landlord takes the rent, knowing that the tenant is granted
a statutory tenancy by the Rent Restrictions Acts and that his right to gain possession
of his dwelling-house depends entirely on his establishing that he brings himself within
the conditions laid down by the Acts."
36. 188 Misc. 188, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1947).
37. Id. at 188, 67 N. Y. S. 2d at 370.
1. People ex rel. Winchester v. Coleman, 133 N. Y. 279, 287, 31 N. E. 96, 98 (1892).
In pointing out the distinction between a joint stock association and a corporation, Judge
Finch remarked: ". . . the one derives its existence from the contract of individuals, the
other from the sovereignty of the state." Chief Judge Cullen, writing for the court
in Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 447, 98 N. E. 855, 856 (1912),
speaks of the certificate of incorporation as the instrument "by which the corporation
got life." In Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N. Y. 112, 121, 126, 60 N. E. 2d 829,
832, 835 ((1945) (dissenting opinion), Judge Conway conceded that "Since corporations
are creatures of statute, their charters and by-laws must conform to the wlh of the cre-
ating power."
2. See, e.g., N. Y. GEN,. Ass'xs LAw § 4; N. Y. P-ax; LAw § 440-b.
3. "The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and iniurinc
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state requires it to fit into the pattern of organization and conduct which the
state has decreed for its existence.
Businessmen for the most part emphasize only the practical feature of limit-
ed liability of shareholders to distinguish the corporation from other group
enterprises. Yet lawyers know that the state through its legislature insists that
corporations observe certain inflexible4 statutory requirements, an observance
not demanded of unincorporated groups. One of these requirements is that
the corporation be managed by its board of directors5 and not by the stock-
holders who elect the board of directors.
Why, it may be asked, should the state be any more concerned with the
manner in which the corporation, as distinct from the partnership, joint stock
association or business trust, conducts its business?
Those cases deciding that only the directors may perform corporate action
proceed upon the theory that directors derive their original authority from
the legislature through the corporate charter.0 Some English cases, however,
proceed rather on the theory that the directors are the representatives of the
incorporated body of stockholders, that the directors acquire their power
from the consent of the incorporators-a consent effectuated by legislative
enactment-and that the directors' powers are made exclusive (i.e., of stock-
holders' control) by contract. 7
companies." INT. REV. CODE § 3797 (a) (3). "The term corporations . . . shall be con-
strued to include all associations and joint-stock companies having any of the powers
or privileges of corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships." N. Y. Co NsT.
Art. X, § 4. See also § 37 of the New York General Construction Law. For relevant
expressions by the courts see, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 701 (1944), 13
FORD. L. REV. 238; UMW v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
4. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592, 75 AtI. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910); Seitz v.
Michel, 148 Minn. 80, 181 N. W. 102 (1921) ; Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick
Theatres Co., 297 N. Y. 174, 77 N. E. 2d 633 (1948) ; Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel,
294 N. Y. 112, 60 N. E. 2d 829 (1945), 45 COL. L. REV. 960; cf. Hayden v. Beane,
293 Mass. 347, 199 N. E. 755 (1936); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936);
Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 98 N. E. 855 (1912).
5. 14 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 7-1 (1939); N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 27. See cases cited
note 14 infra.
6. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. 592, 75 AtI. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910); Hoyt v.
Thompson's Ex'rs, 19 N. Y. 207 (1859); Dubbs v. Kramer, 302 Pa. 455, 153 AtI. 733
(1931); Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 AtI. 369 (1930); 2 FLETCHER, CoRPoaAIoNs
§ 507 (rev. ed. 1931). This view has been strongly criticized by Professor Stevens who
says that simply "because a board of directors cannot be controlled by the vote of a ma-
jority of shareholders, it does not and should not follow that therefore the board Is not
representative of the whole body of shareholders, and that it cannot be controlled by
such decision of the shareholders as does not constitute a breach of the contract between
the latter." STEVENS, CORPORATioNS 549 (1936).
7. "I do not think it true to say that the directors are agents. I think it is more
nearly true to say that they are in the position of managing partners appointed to fill that
post by a mutual arrangement between all the shareholders." Automatic Self-Cleansing
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Position of tire New Fork Courts Prior to Clark v. Dodge
New York's adherence to the first of the two theories set forth above was
firmly enunciated in the early case of Hoyt v. Thompson's Ex'rss where Judge
Comstock spoke of the powers of a board of directors as being "in a very im-
portant sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor
can they revoke those powers. They are derivative only in the sense of being
received from the state in the act of incorporation." Despite the criticism levied
against it that view has, until recently, consistently received the approval of
the New York Court of Appeals.10 Whether, however, it is still accepted with-
out qualification remains to be seen.11
In Manson v. Curtis'2 plaintiff sued to recover damages for breach of a con-
tract wherein the defendant, for a good consideration, had promised to vote his
stock in such a way as in effect to establish the plaintiff as a one-man board
of directors. 3 The court struck down the agreement as illegal and void on
the ground that "Clearly the law does not permit the stockholders to create
a sterilized board of directors."'14 The statutory requirement that "The busi-
ness of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors"'* had been
rendered a complete nullity. The language used by the Court of Appeals in
declaring the agreement invalid was strong and unequivocal: "Corporations
are the creatures of the state and must comply with the exactions and regula-
tions it imposes."' 1 Nevertheless, the full force of that language was consid-
erably dissipated by the dictun in the very last paragraph of the opinion, viz.:
"The rule that all the stockholders by their universal consent may do as they
choose with the corporate concerns and assets, provided the interests of
creditors are not affected, because they are the complete owners of the cor-
poration, cannot be invoked here."17 Whether or not that statement was in-
Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd v. Cuninghame, [1906] 2 Ch. D. 34, 45; cf. Marshall's Valve
Gear Co., Ltd. v. Manning, Wardle & Co., Ltd., [1909] 1 Ch. D. 267. See also 1Ton,.vrz=,
PRIVATE CoRPoRATIoNs § 511 (2d ed. 1886); STEVENS, CORORATIO;S 548-49 (1936).
S. 19 N. Y. 207, 216 (1859).
9. BALLA-ezE. CORPORATOxNS § 46 (rev. ed. 1946); STEvENS, CoRPoRATos 547-48
(1936).
10. See, e.g., Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 322, 119 N. E. 559, 562 (1918); People
ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N. Y. 194, 200, 94 N. E. 634, 637 (1911).
11. See notes 24, 34-38, and accompanying text.
12. 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918).
13. In the language of the court: "the fundamental and dominant intent and pur-
pose of the agreement was that through its fulfillment there should be ,'Cested in or
continue to be vested in the plaintiff solely and exclusively, for the period named, the
executive administration of the affairs of the corporation." Id. at 320-21, 119 N. E. at 561.
14. Id. at 323, 119 N. E. at 562. Authorities in accord are numerous. See, e.g., West
v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507 (1890); Ray v. Homewood Hosp., 27 N. IV. 2d 409 (Minn.
1947); Hamblen v. Horwitz-Texan Theatres Co., 162 S. AV. 2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942);
cf. Miller v. Vanderlip, 285 N. Y. 116, 33 N. E. 2d 51 (1941), 54 HLRv. L. REV. 1398.
15. N. Y. Gm. Co". LAw § 27.
16. 223 N. Y. 313, 323, 119 N. E. 559, 562.
17. Id. at 325, 119 N. E. at 562-63.
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tended to mean that the decision in that case would have been different had
all the stockholders entered into the agreement can only be a matter for specu-
lation. One thing is certain: in subsequent decisions involving unanimous
agreement of stockholders the Court of Appeals has not seen fit to draw an
affirmative inference from the quoted statement.18  In addition to the above
quoted dictum the court in the Manson case uttered another gratuity, which
served to render even more uncertain the state of the law with respect to stock-
holders' agreements, when it said that "Shareholders have the right to com-
bine their interests and voting powers to secure such control of the corpora-
tion and the adoption of and adhesion by it to a specific policy and course
of business."'19 Whether the New York courts will sanction an agreement
which tends to bind a director's discretion as to policy is subsequently to be
considered.
In McQuade v. Stoneham,20 decided some sixteen years after the. Manson
case, a much more innocuous agreement than that invalidated in the earlier
case was also declared invalid. Therein the contract between the parties pro-
vided for the'election and remuneration of officers and for the adhesion by the
18. Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N. Y. 174, 77
N. E. 2d 633 (1948) ; Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N. Y. 112, 60 N. E. 2d 829
(1945); cf. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936). But cf. Spencer v. Lowe,
198 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 8th 1912), 13 COL. L. Rav. 257 (1913) (although the by-laws gave
to the directors the power to declare dividends, it was held that a dividend declared unani-
mously by the stockholders, at a meeting attended by all the directors, was valid);
Groh's Sons v. Groh, 80 App. Div. 85, 80 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1st Dep't 1903) (when all
the stockholders of a "family" corporation have agreed to divide profits there is a cor-
porate act). In Kassel v. Empire Tinware Co., 178 App. Div. 176, 180, 164 N. Y. Supp.
1033, 1035 (2d Dep't 1917), the court stated that since "the parties to the action are the
complete owners of the corporation, there is no reason why the exercise of the power
and discretion of the directors cannot be controlled by valid agreement between them-
selves, provided that the interests of creditors are not affected." That language was quoted
with approval by the Court of Appeals in Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 416, 199 N. E.
641, 643 (1936); yet, when read in connection with another observation made by the
court in the Kassel case with respect to the facts before it, i.e., that "The rule of law which
confides to the directors of a corporation the power to determine what dividends shall be
declared, will not avail to confer on them the power to commit a fraud," the first quoted
statement would seem to lose much of its significance. 178 App. Div. at 179, 164 N. Y.
Supp. at 1035.
19. 223 N. Y. 313, 320, 119 N. E. 559, 561 (1918) (italics supplied). Judge Lehman,
concurring in McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 333, 335, 189 N. E. 234, 238, 239
(1934), found it "difficult to reconcile" the decision in the McQuade case with the "state-
ments in the opinion in Manson v. Curtis that 'it is not illegal or against public policy
for two or more stockholders owning the majority of the shares of stock to unite upon a
course of corporate policy or action, or upon the officers whom they will elect,' and that
'shareholders have the right to combine their interests and voting powers to secure such
control of the corporation and the adoption of and adhesion by it to a specific policy
and course of business.'"
20. 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934), Note, 44 YALE L. J. 873 (1935).
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corporation to established policies. The Court of Appeals, without placing par-
ticular emphasis on the fact that all the shareholders were not parties to
the agreement,21 conceded as well settled the rule that stockholders may unite
to elect directors, and added: "The power to unite is, however, limited to the
election of directors and is not extended to contracts whereby limitations are
placed on the power of directors to manage the business of the corporation
by the selection of agents at definite salaries." 22 And then followed the language
which would seemingly admit of no exception: ". . . a contract is illegal and
void so far as it precludes the board of directors, at the risk of incurring legal
liability, from changing officers, salaries or policies or retaining individuals
in office, except by consent of the contracting parties."' -
Clark v. Dodge
Despite the just quoted language from McQuade v. Stoneham the Court of
Appeals in Clark v. Dodge,2 4 a decision which has undoubtedly become a land-
mark in the law of corporations in this state, expressly limited the McQuade
case to its facts, disclaiming what the court now chose to term the "broad
dicta" in the latter.2 In the Dodge case plaintiff, one of the two sole stock-
holders of the corporation, entered into an agreement with the defendant, the
other and majority stockholder, wherein the latter agreed that in return for
plaintiff's divulging the formula of a secret process (known to the plaintiff
alone) to the defendant's son, which plaintiff did, the defendant would (1) vote
his stock so as to continue plaintiff as director, (2) continue him as general
manager so long as he should prove faithful, efficient and competent, (3) see
21. See note 27 infra. In Dubbs v. Kramer, 302 Pa. 455, 1S3 At. 733 (1931), the
contract between plaintiff (a director, officer and minority stockholder) and defendant
(a director, officer and majority stockholder) provided that the board was to vote
plaintiff a named compensation which was to continue for five years and which was not
to be reduced unless the corporation became unable to pay. The court quoted and ap-
proved as correctly stating the law a portion of the opinion of the lower court in which
there was included the statement that "'He (a director] cannot contract to use his
vote for the benefit of anyone else, or even for the benefit of the corporation."' Id. at
457, 153 At. at 734.
22. 263 N. Y. 323, 329, 189 N. E. 234, 236 (1934).
23. Id. at 330, 189 N. E. at 237.
24. 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936). This decision was commented upon in a
number of Law Reviews. See, e.g., 36 CoL. L. Rxv. 836 (1936) and Note, 13 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 585. In connection with the Dodge case cf. Roberts v. San Jacinto Shipbuilders,
198 S. W. 2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); see Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 33, 39 S. IV.
4S6, 492 (1897).
25. Any critical appraisal of the decision in McQuade v. Stoneham must recognize that
it was a "two-pronged" decision. Aside from its holding that the agreement therein vio-
lated Section 27 the court gave "a further reason for reverAal," i.e., that the contract
resulted in an employment which was itself illegal. In fact, Judge Lehman, in a con-
curring opinion in which Judge Crouch joined, refused to go along with the majority
on the ground that the agreement violated Section 27 and based his opinion for reversal
entirely on the second ground.
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to it that plaintiff received one-fourth of the net income as salary or dividends
and (4) see that no unreasonable salaries were paid to other officers and
agents. The court granted specific performance of the agreement.20 In addi-
tion to the strong equities existing in favor of the plaintiff in the Dodge case,
there are two important differences between the agreement in it and that in
the McQuade case. First, the agreement in the Dodge case was entered into
by the two sole stockholders of the corporation, a fact not present in the
McQuade case. 27 Secondly, there was in the Dodge case agreement no gen-
eral limitation upon the power of the directors to take action in any matter
which might "in any wise affect ... rights of minority stockholders."28 The
quoted limitation upon the directors' discretion in the McQuade case, which
could be waived only upon the unanimous consent of the parties to the agree-
ment, might well be considered a most vital obstacle to the validity of the
agreement in that case. No such limitation was present in the Dodge case;
nevertheless, the court, after referring to the "statutory norm," -0 asked itself
this question partly by way of dictum: "Are we committed by the McQuade
case to the doctrine that there may be no variation, however slight or innocu-
ous, from the norm where salaries or policies or the retention of individuals in
office are concerned?" 30 The court included in its rhetorical question the term
"policies" despite the fact that the only provisions of the agreement which
could in any way be deemed a limitation upon the discretion of the board
were the second and third and they referred only to salaries and the reten-
tion of individuals in office, 31 not to policies in the broad sense in which that
term was apparently used in the question.
Notwithstanding the court's seemingly unqualified approval of the so-called
"damage test,"'32 the actual holding of the Dodge case would seem to be re-
26. It has been pointed out by one writer that as a practical matter specific perform-
ance should not ordinarily be granted. Meck, Employment of Corporate Executives by
Majority Stockholders, 47 YALE L. J. 1079, 1090 n. 28 (1939). For cases denying specific
performance see, e.g., Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S. W. 376 (1917); Sulli-
van v. Parkes, 69 App. Div. 221, 74 N. Y. Supp. 787 (1st Dep't 1902). In a recent case,
however, the court decreed specific performance of a voting agreement. Ringling v. Ring-
ling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 53 A. 2d 441 (Del. Ch. 1947), 60
HARV. L. REV. 651 (1947) (see note 58 infra).
27. See text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
28. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 326-27, 189 N. E. 234, 235 (1934).
29. N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 27.
30. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 415, 199 N. E. 641, 642 (1936) (italics supplied).
In West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507 (1890), it was held that a contract with one who held
the controlling interest in a company that the plaintiff should be permanently re-
tained as an officer at a fixed salary was void as against public policy. Luedke v. Oleen,
72 N. D. 1, 4 N. W. 2d 201 (1942); see Bond v. Graf, 163 Ore. 264, 96 P. 2d 1091, 1093
(1939).
31. As to the "faithful, efficient and competent" requirement of the second provision,
the presence of such conduct would seem to be required even in the absence of an express
provision to that effect. Fells v. Katz, 256 N. Y. 67, 175 N. E. 516 (1931).
32. Note, 28 COL. L. REv. 366, 372 (1928), cited with approval in Clark v. Dodge.
See also note 48 infra.
[Vol. 17
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stricted to this: An agreement as to salaries and the retention of individuals
in office entered into by all the stockholders of a close corporation, which agree-
ment amounts to nothing more than a slight impingement upon the provisions
of Section 27 of the General Corporation Law, will be upheld by the New York
courts if there is "no damage suffered by or threatened to anybody."
Some More-Recent Cases
That the unnecessarily broad language in Clark v. Dodge prompted what
would now appear to be unwarranted constructions of the decision in that case
may perhaps be illustrated by a discussion of Mattcr of Buckle,. 4 In that case
it seems that less than all the stockholders passed a by-law which forbade the
board of directors to remove without cause the chairman of the board or its
president. Section 60 of the New York Stock Corporation Law clearly author-
izes the directors to remove corporate officers without cause.m This court,
taking the position that the court in the Dodge case had not distinquished the
McQuade case on the ground that there was no unanimity of agreement among
the stockholders in the latter case, reasoned that: "If an agreement that direc-
tors are to continue a person as officer as long as he shall be faithful, efficient
and competent is legal and valid, it must follow that a by-law that directors
are not to remove a person from office without cause is likewise legal and valid
as an equally harmless and slight infringement upon the provisions of section
27 of the General Corporation Law and section 60 of the Stock Corporation
Law. The agreement to continue the plaintiff in the Clark case ... in office
as long as he should be faithful, efficient and competent in effect prohibited
33. 269 N. Y. 410, 417, 199 N. E. 641, 643 (1936). But c. the lower court decision
in Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 188 Misc. 793, 66 N. Y. S.
2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1947), and Matter of Buckley, 183 Misc. 189, 50 N. Y. S. 2d (Sup. CL
1944) (see text accompanying notes 34-38 infra). As to the provision in the Dodge case
that no unreasonable salaries were to be paid to other officers and agents, that provision,
had it not been expressed, would probably have been present by implication. As to the
provision that defendant would vote his stock so as to continue plaintiff as director, agree-
ments whereby stockholders pledge themselves to vote for certain persons as directors
are by the clear weight of authority legal and enforceable if, without fraud, the stock-
holders seek to accomplish that which they might have accomplished without the agree-
ment. Morris v. The Broadview, 328 Ill. App. 314, 65 N. E. 2d 605 (1946); Brightman v.
Bates, 175 Mass. 105, 111, 55 N. E. 809, 811 (1900). In the words of Holmes, C. J., speak-
ing for the court in the last cited case: "If stockholders want to make their power felt.
they must unite." See Wormser, The Legality of Corporate Voting Trusts and Pooling
Agreements, 18 COL. aL. REv. 123 (1918). Contra: Harney v. Linville Improvement Co,
118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 489 (1896) ; Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 AU. 369 (1930) ; see
Trumbo v. Bank of Berkeley, 77 Cal. App. 2d 704, 709, 176 P. 2d 376, 379 (1947) ; Cummins
v. McCoy, 22 Tenn. App. 681, 125 S. W. 2d 509, 513 (1938). In New York voting trusts
have been expressly authorized by statute. N. Y. ST0Co CoRP. LAw § S0.
34. 183 Misc. 189, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1944). See also the lower court decision
in Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 188 Misc. 793, 66 N. Y.
S. 2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
35. "The directors .. . may remove him [officer, agent or employee] at pleasure!'
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the directors from removing him at their pleasure and thus is legally equiva-
lent to the by-law in the case at bar which forbids the directors from remov-
ing the Chairman of the Board without cause."30
While it must be conceded that the Court of Appeals in the Dodge case
did not in so many words distinguish the McQuade case on the ground of lack
of unanimity of agreement among the stockholders in the latter, the facts
remain that: (1) the court spent a considerable portion of its opinion in citing,
discussing and quoting from cases wherein the stockholders' agreements had
been unanimous; (2) the dictum3 7 from the Manson case (which was cited
along with the McQuade case for the proposition that in those cases the boards
of directors had been sterilized) was quoted expressly to point out that the
stockholders' agreement in the Manson case had not been unanimous; and
(3) there was unanimity of agreement among the stockholders in the Dodge
case.
It is submitted, therefore, that even if it be conceded that in the Buckley
case the impingement upon Section 60 of the Stock Corporation Law was
slight, the absence of a unanimous agreement of all the stockholders would
seem to render the decision therein an unwarranted extension of Clark v.
Dodge.3 8
The warning that all the stockholders of a corporation, even of a close cor-
poration, may not, in disregard of seemingly mandatory statutory require-
ments, determine for themselves the manner in which a corporation may be
managed and directed was sounded in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel.3 0 In that
case the stockholders agreed to, and later did, vote for by-laws which re-
quired that: (1) no action be taken by the stockholders except by the unani-
mous vote of all; (2) directors could be elected only by unanimous vote of
all the shareholders; and (3) no action could be taken by the board of
directors except it be the unanimous act of all.40 The minority stockholder
sued for a judgment declaring the validity of the by-laws and an injunction
restraining the defendant from doing anything inconsistent with them. The
majority of the Court of Appeals declared the by-laws to be invalid and denied
the injunction, three judges dissenting as to the third by-law. The court, in
reaching its conclusion, once again emphasized the special position occupied
by corporations in our law when it said: "The State, granting to individuals
the privilege of limiting their individual liabilities for business debts by form-
ing themselves into an entity separate and distinct from the persons who own
it, demands in turn that the entity take a prescribed form and conduct, pro-
36. 183 Misc. 189, 194, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 54, 58 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
37. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
38. But see Note, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 150, 154 (1948).
39. 294 N. Y. 112, 60 N. E. 2d 829 (1945); cf. Tompkins v. Hale, 284 N. Y. 675,
30 N. E. 2d 721 (1940); Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N. Y. 442,
98 N. E. 855 (1912). See note 42 infra.
40. A fourth by-law requiring unanimous action for amending the by-laws was upheld
by the court.
[Vol. 17
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cedurally, according to fixed rules." 41 And, further on: "The State has an
interest in seeing to it that such 'private laws' or by-laws as the corporation
adopts are not inconsistent with the public law and not such as will turn the
corporation into some other kind of entity."'
The very recently decided case of Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick
Theatres Co.43 presents the interesting and less common problem of the validi-
ty of an agreement entered into by all the stockholders of a large as distin-
guished from a close corporation as the latter type of corporation is tradi-
tionally understood.4 4 There, a stockholder of Trenton-New Brunswick Thea-
tres Company, a New Jersey corporation,4 5 brought what eventually turned
into an action to have determined the validity of an agreement entered into
by all the stockholders of the latter corporation with B. F. Keith Corporation
for the management of the theatres owned by Trenton. The latter corpora-
tion's 1000 shares of stock were divided into four equal classes designated
A-1, A-2, B and C, respectively, each of which classes was given the sole and
exclusive right to name one of the four directors. Classes A-1 and A-2 were
owned by Keith, Class B by plaintiff and Class C by a third corporation. The
agreement provided that for its term of nineteen years40 the management was
41. 294 N. Y. 112, 118, 60 N. E. 2d 829, 831 (1945).
42. Id. at 121, 60 N. E. 2d at 832. See also Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N. J. Eq. S92,
599, 75 AUt. 568, 571 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910). In striking down the by-law which required
unanimous stock vote for the election of directors, the court in the Benintendi case re-
lied upon Matter of Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 430 (1st Dep't 1921), aff'd without opinion, 231 N. Y. 615, 132 N. E. 910
(1921), wherein a provision similar to the just mentioned by-law was found in
the certificate of incorporation. The Appellate Division held that such a provision
contravened § 55 of the Stock Corporation Law. A provision in a certificate of in-
corporation requiring the unanimous consent of all the stockholders in order to effect
a change in the number of directors was held valid in Ripin v. United States Woven Label
Co., 205 N. Y. 442, 98 N. E. 855 (1912), the applicable statute being deemed permissive
rather than mandatory. Winer, Proposing A New York "Close Corporation Law," 28
CoRN. L. Q. 313, 316 n.11 (1943), has this to say of the Ripin case: "The distinction
between preserving the number of and the identical directors may be a substantial one.
The ground in the opinion, however, that the statute says the number of directors 'may'
be increased, but directors 'shall' be elected by a plurality, is not convincing, as neither
thought could have been expressed the other way. See N. Y. SToCK ConronATo Law
§§ 35, 55." Section 14 of the New York General Corporation Law provides that "Every cor-
poration as such has power, though not specified in the law under which it is incorporated:
5. To make by-laws, not inconsistent with law. . . ." (Italics supplied.)
43. 297 N. Y. 174, 77 N. E. 2d 633 (1948).
44. Although in the Long Park case the stockholders were three in number they were
all corporations some of which presumably had stockholders of their own. In this Com-
ment the discussion proceeds on the assumption that such a corporation is not a "clos&"
corporation as that term is usually understood. ". . . when a single corporation with
1000 stockholders is the sole stockholder in a subsidiary, the latter is not a close cor-
poration." Winer, supra note 42, at 315.
45. See note 50 infra.
46. Justice Peck, dissenting in the Appellate Division, 272 App. Div. 902, 904, 71 N. Y. S.
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to be designated by the holders of the Class A-1 and Class A-2 stock unless
changed as otherwise provided in the agreement. The only provision for
changing the management was that the holders of a majority of the B stock
and a majority of the C stock jointly could submit to the American Arbitra-
tion Association the question whether there should be a change in manage-
ment.4 7 In other words, the management was at all times to be designated
by half the stockholders, the remaining stockholders and, most importantly,
the directors, to have nothing to say about the important question of manage-
ment.
The trial court entered a judgment for the defendant, basing its decision
upon what it quite candidly characterized as the "dictum" in Clark v. Dodge."8
The majority of the Appellate Division affirmed without opinion, Justice
Peck voicing a strong and articulate dissent. 49 The Court of Appeals reversed,
one judge dissenting,5° and contented itself with distinguishing the Dodge
case5 ' and holding that "the powers of the directors .. .were completely ster-
2d 369, 372 (1st Dep't 1947), speaks of the term of the agreement as follows: ". . . this
is no contract for management by Keith or any other designated person for any period
of time. It is a contract for designation of the management from time to time by whoever
happens to be from time to time the holders of certain classes of stock-that is Keith
today, but maybe someone else tomorrow, and someone else the next day-the right to
designate the management running with the particular classes of stock which happen to
have the privilege that year."
47. There was a further qualification that after the first change in management no
other could be made within one year from the effective date of the last change in man-
agement.
48. "'Public policy, the intention of the Legislature, detriment to the corporation, are
phrases which in this connection mean little. Possible harm to bona fide purchasers of
stock or to creditors or to stockholding minorities have more substance; but such harms
are absent in many instances. If the enforcement of a particular contract damages no-
body,-not even, in any perceptible degree, the public-one sees no reason for holding it
illegal, even though it impinges slightly upon the broad provisions of section 27. Damage
suffered or threatened is a logical and practical test, and has come to be the one gen-
erally adopted by the courts.'" 188 Misc. 793, 795, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 165, 166 (Sup.
Ct. 1947).
49. 272 App. Div. 902, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (1st Dep't 1947).
50. Judge Fuld, although indicating that he "might" were the court "dealing with a
corporation organized and operating in this State," agree with the majority that the
agreement violated the statute, dissented on the ground that since the "declaration granted
goes to the very heart" of the affairs of a foreign corporation the New York courts should
refuse to entertain jurisdiction. This despite the fact that the applicable New Jersey
statute (see note 2 supra) is almost identical to that of New York and, it might be
added, has been at least as strictly construed.
51. In speaking of Clark v. Dodge the court said simply: "We think these restrictions
and limitations went far beyond the agreement in Clark v. Dodge (269 N. Y. 410). We
are not confronted with a slight impingement or innocuous variance from the statutory
norm, but rather with the deprivation of all the powers of the board insofar as the selec-
tion and supervision of the management of the corporation's theatres, including the
manner and policy of their operation, are concerned." 297 N. Y. 174, 179, 77 N. E. 2d
633, 635 (1948).
COMMENTS
ilized, -52 citing the Beniztendi, McQuade and Manson cases. Students of cor-
poration law and practitioners must resign themselves to a case by case de-
velopment of this most important phase of the law. It seems needless to point
out that generalizations from the decisions extant are to be made cautiously.
Conclusion
In corporations with many stockholders, especially where their interests
may be conflicting, the statutory norm is undoubtedly a necessary one.53 It fur-
nishes protection against abuse of corporate power and control. Yet where there
is unanimity among the stockholders, 4 those primarily to be protected, and
the general public or creditors are not concerned, what interest has the state
in insisting on the observance of the letter of the statutory mandate? Clark
v. Dodge, which may have intimated the disinterestedness of the state on such
observance, has unquestionably been limited almost strictly to its facts by the
Benintendi and Long Park cases.
Will the New York Court of Appeals follow the decision in the Dodge case
only in cases involving dose corporations or will unanimous agreements of
stockholders, even of large corporations, be held valid provided that there is
only a "slight impingement" on Section 27 and an absence of damage to
anyone? There seems to be no valid reason why the court should not, at
least in such cases, disregard the artificial and highly unsatisfactory distinc-
tion which apparently continues to be drawn between close and large corpora-
tions. It seems to be time to harken to realities and to give legal recognition
to the fact that contracts such as that involved in the Long Park case afford a
practical solution for many problems of corporate management.:
52. 297 N. Y. 174, 179, 77 N. E. 2d 633, 634-35 (1948).
53. In the words of Judge Lehman, concurring in McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323,
333, 336, 189 N. E. 234, 238, 239 (1934), "In truth the board of directors may check the arbi-
trary will of those who would otherwise completely control the corporation, but cannot
indefinitely thwart their will. A contract which destroys this check contravenes 'express char-
ter or statutory provisions' and is, therefore, illegal." That the courts will be astute to pro-
tect the interests of non-assenting stockholders is well illustrated by the case of Odxman v.
Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N. E. 2d 439 (1946). Therein the contract entered into between four
of the five stockholders was held invalid, the court saying (id. at 25, 64 N. E. 2d at 440):
"There was one stockholder not a party to the contract who might be injuriously affected
by it .... The contract was not restricted as to time. . . .The contract by its terms pur-
ported to control the conduct of some of the parties as directors, in which capacity they
were in all respects fiduciaries for the corporation.. .. " See Odell v. Wells, 183 App. Div.
242, 247, 171 N. Y. Supp. 345, 349 (4th Dep't 1918).
54. See note 24 supra. In addition to the Dodge case see the leading Massachusetts
case of Hayden v. Beane, 293 Mass. 347, 199 N. E. 755 (1936), discussed at length in
Mfeck, supra note 26, at 1091-92. Cf. Hellier v. Achorn, 255 Mass. 273, 151 N. E. 305
(1926). See note 18 supra.
55. "In conclusion it should be emphasized that in the situation of the corporation with
a single majority stockholder there seems to be no justification for an arbitrary rule in-
validating all contracts of the type under consideration. Within the confines of that situ-
ation, the cases involving tangible injury to anyone should be handled on the basis of
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There is, of course, no disputing the fact that prior adjudications in this
state completely support the decision of the Court of Appeals in this most re-
cent case. Certainly the abandonment of the entire management to persons
other than directors was a clear violation of the well-established proposition
that "the law does not permit the stockholders to create a sterilized board of
directors,"56 and failed to conform to the principle which upholds the validity
of an agreement "though it impinges slightly upon the broad provision of Sec-
tion 27.1'57 In fact the agreement went even further and in a certain contingen-
cy permitted a person not even a stockholder or director, but a complete
stranger, to designate the management. Even under a more liberal construc-
tion of stockholders' agreements it might well be contended that the provision
for arbitration might in itself be sufficient to render the agreement invalid. 8
It must be conceded that the strict view taken towards stockholders' agree-
ments has now become too strongly entrenched in the law of this state for one
reasonably to expect any considerable change by way of decision. Legisla-
tive modification or repeal of Section 27 of the General Corporation Law seems
to offer the only solution if there is to be any departure from the inflexible
and unrealistic rule which now obtains."
their own particular facts . . . . whatever the rule of law may be, the reasonable use
of such cohtracts achieves a very practical end. As such, no doubt lawyers will continuo
to draw them, and if the tendency of the New York court in Clark v. Dodge and that of
the Massachusetts court in Hayden v. Beane and Mansfield v. Lang continues to grow, it
would seem that eventually such contracts will be legally acceptable everywhere." Meck,
supra note 26, at 1098. "Besides, such agreements . . . even if regarded as open to the
objection that they pledge in advance the action of officers or stockholders, may be sus-
tained on the ground of the practical necessity that it would be impossible to organize
a corporation if its proper management were not assured." Mansfield v. Lang, 293 Mass.
386, 391, 200 N. E. 110, 113 (1936).
56. Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 323, 119 N. E. 559, 562 (1918). But cf. Meck,
supra note 26, at 1093 n. 33.
57. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 415, 199 N. E. 641, 642 (1936).
58. But cf. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 53 A.
2d 441 (Del. Ch. 1947), 60 HARV. L. REv. 651. Therein the court granted specific per-
formance of a voting agreement which provided that in case the parties thereto dis-
agreed as to how they should vote they would vote as a named arbitrator would decide.
5§. Pursuant to recommendation by the Law Revision Commission (See LEo. Doc.
No. 65 (K) 1948)) a new section, now before the Governor for approval, has been
recommended for adoption as an amendment to the New York Stock Corporation Law.
The section permits, upon compliance with certain conditions, a certificate of incorpora-
tion, as originally filed or as amended, to include provisions requiring more than the
statutory majority or plurality for a quorum, vote or consent of directors or sharehold-
ers. The section will, if adopted, overrule the Court of Appeals' holding in the Benintendi
case only with respect to the first (unanimous stockholder action) and third (unanimous
director action) by-laws adopted by the parties to the action therein. The court's in-
validation of the second by-law, which provided that directors could be elected only by
unanimous vote of all the stockholders, would seem to remain unaffected by the pro-
posed statute. See also Winer, supra note 42, at 335 et seq., especially §§ 36, 37 and 39
of Mr. Winer's proposed "Close Corporation Law." (The Governor approved the bill
on April 6, 1948, effective September 1, 1948. N. Y. Laws 1948, c. 862.)
COMMENTS
TAXPAYER'S ACTION AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS TO PREVENT
ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONAL USE OF STATE FUNDS
A recent case in New York raises again the question of the right of a tax-
payer to maintain against state officials an action to restrain an alleged uncon-
stitutional use of state funds.' Acting under the authority of a statute, a
state board allocated state funds to a college operated by a religious corpora-
tion, for the enlargement of its facilities in order to meet problems of in-
creased enrollment of veterans as students. Plaintiff, as a citizen and taxpayer,
brought an action against members of the board, the college and the contrac-
tor employed by it. He asked for judgment declaring the projected use of
state funds unconstitutional as involving a grant of public funds to a denomi-
national educational institution and for an injunction restraining the board from
paying out any funds for work done on the project. The complaint was dis-
missed on the ground that plaintiff had not shown sufficient interest to en-
title him to maintain his action.
Seemingly well established principles have long closed the door to such ac-
tions in New York. Other states have seen the problem differently. Plaintiff
urged a review of the New York position and the adoption of reasoning ad-
vanced elsewhere in support of his action.
The Basis of the New York Position
Long before the enactment of a special statute2 allowing "taxpayers' actions"
against municipalities, the New York courts had held that an individual tax-
payer had no right to bring suit to enjoin alleged illegal expenditures of either
state or municipal funds.? The New York courts, after the enactment of the
statute referred to, repeatedly held that it could not be construed as giving
the taxpayer a right of action against the state or state officials.4 So far as
such actions are concerned, the view announced long ago has been often re-
stated, that the plaintiff must show something more than a mere status as a
taxpayer or citizen "to challenge the public officers to meet him in the courts
of justice to defend their official acts."5 He must show more than zeal for
the purity of the constitution. No person or group of persons can assume to
be the guardians of the community. Incumbent on the plaintiff is the duty of
showing that he has an interest in the action distinguishable from one which
he -has in common with the general body of the state's citizens.
1. Bull v. Stitchman, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (Appeal nor: pending,
Appellate Division, Fourth Department); Buli v. Stitchman, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 202 (Sup.
CL 1947).
2. N. Y. Grax. MuNac. LAW § 51.
3. Reynolds v. Mayor of Albany, 8 Barb. 597, 599 (N. Y. 1850); Butler v. Kent, 19
Johns. 223, 225 (N. Y. 1821).
4. Goldstein v. State Commission of Correction, 182 Misc. 695, 45 N. Y. S. .1d 476
(Sup. Ct. 1943); New York League for Separation of Church & State v. Graves, 170
Misc. 196, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520,
106 N. E. 675 (1914).
5. Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N. Y. 155, 163 (1858).
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